The game equilibrium in networks described by the two-period Romer model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities is considered. In the first period, each agent can invest some share of his resources. In the second period, the consumption depends on his investment and productivity as well as the investments of his network neighbors. The unification dynamics are described by a system of difference equations. For a complete network with an arbitrary number of homogeneous agents and also for a triangle (a complete network with three types of agents possessing different productivities), possible equilibria are studied and their dynamic stability under different combinations of the game parameters is analyzed.

考虑了由生产和知识外部性两个阶段的内生增长的罗默模型描述的网络中的博弈均衡。在第一个阶段，每个代理商都可以投资一部分资源。在第二阶段，消费取决于他的投资和生产率以及他的网络邻居的投资。统一动力学由差分方程系统描述。对于具有任意数量的齐次代理的完整网络以及对于三角形（具有三种具有不同生产率的代理的完整网络），研究了可能的平衡，并分析了在不同博弈参数组合下的动态稳定性。