Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on chance? We show the answer is yes by describing two nondeterministic voting methods, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Our theoretical analysis and agent-based simulation experiments suggest that with these, majorities cannot consistently suppress minorities as with deterministic methods, proponents of the status quo cannot block decisions as in consensus-based approaches, the resulting aggregate welfare is comparable to existing methods, and average randomness is lower than for other nondeterministic methods.

中文翻译：

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通过非确定性比例共识进行有效的民主决策

是否有投票方法 (i) 即使选民采取战略行动，也赋予每个人（包括少数族裔）平等份额的有效权力，(ii) 促进共识而不是两极分化和不平等，以及 (iii) 不赞成现状或过于依赖现状机会多吗？我们通过描述两种非确定性投票方法来证明答案是肯定的，一种基于彩票的自动讨价还价，另一种基于批准妥协选项的有条件承诺。我们的理论分析和基于代理的模拟实验表明，在这些情况下，多数人不能像确定性方法那样始终如一地压制少数人，现状的支持者不能像基于共识的方法那样阻止决策，由此产生的总福利与现有方法相当，