Theories of explanation need to account for a puzzling feature of our explanatory practices: the fact that we prefer explanations that are relatively abstract but only moderately so. Contra Franklin-Hall ([2016]), I argue that the interventionist account of explanation provides a natural and elegant explanation of this fact. By striking the right balance between specificity and generality, moderately abstract explanations optimally subserve what interventionists regard as the goal of explanation, namely, identifying possible interventions that would have changed the explanandum. 1. Introduction2. Interventionism, Proportionality, and Franklin-Hall’s Objection3. Exhaustivity Reconsidered4. Interventionism and the Explanatory Value of Specificity5. Conclusion Introduction Interventionism, Proportionality, and Franklin-Hall’s Objection Exhaustivity Reconsidered Interventionism and the Explanatory Value of Specificity Conclusion

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解释性抽象和金发姑娘问题：干预主义使事情恰到好处

解释理论需要解释我们解释实践的一个令人费解的特征：我们更喜欢相对抽象但只是适度的解释。与 Franklin-Hall ([2016]) 相反，我认为干预主义的解释解释为这一事实提供了自然而优雅的解释。通过在特殊性和一般性之间取得适当的平衡，适度抽象的解释可以最佳地支持干预主义者认为的解释目标，即确定可能会改变解释的干预措施。1. 介绍 2. 干预主义、比例性和富兰克林霍尔的反对意见 3。重新考虑穷举4。干预主义和特异性的解释价值 5。结论 介绍 干预主义，比例性，