Ontic structural realism (OSR) is a thesis of fundamentality metaphysics: the thesis that structure, not objects, has fundamental status. Claimed as the metaphysic most befitting of modern physics, OSR first emerged as an entreaty to eliminate objects from the metaphysics of fundamental physics. Such elimination was urged by Steven French and James Ladyman on the grounds that only it could resolve the ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by physics’ that they claimed reduced any putative objectual commitment to a merely ‘ersatz’ form of realism. Few, however, have joined French and Ladyman either in acknowledging that such underdetermination exists or in attributing to it such drastic consequences. However, an alternative view that physics does sanction objects, albeit merely as ontologically secondary entities, represents a different and seemingly less extreme route to the same conclusion regarding the fundamentality of structure. But since what it means to be ‘ontologically prior’ is itself a vexed philosophical question, a stance must be taken as to how we are to understand priority before its prospects may be evaluated. In an earlier paper, I outlined how Fine’s notion of ontological dependence might be utilized to defend the priority-based approach to structuralism. Since then, however, I have become convinced that that ontological dependence is not a relation of priority after all. As a result, the arguments outlined in that paper stand in need of reassessment. In this work, I consider the prospects for priority-based structuralism when expressed in the idiom of determination. My conclusion will be that it has yet to be vindicated by our best physical theories, owing to the failure of symmetry structures to determine the world’s inventory of fundamental kinds. Nevertheless, the same symmetry considerations point towards there being renewed prospects for eliminativism—an eliminativism, moreover, of more naturalistic appeal than that hitherto associated with OSR. 1. Introduction2. Structuralist Strategies3. Defining Ontological Priority: Dependence or Determination?4. Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination 4.1. Determining plurality4.2. Determining kind properties5. A Reinvigorated Eliminativism Introduction Structuralist Strategies Defining Ontological Priority: Dependence or Determination? Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination 4.1. Determining plurality4.2. Determining kind properties Determining plurality Determining kind properties A Reinvigorated Eliminativism

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决定性习语中的结构主义

本体结构实在论 (OSR) 是基本性形而上学的论点：结构而非对象具有根本地位的论点。OSR 被称为最适合现代物理学的形而上学，最初是作为一种恳求从基础物理学的形而上学中消除对象。史蒂文·弗兰奇和詹姆斯·拉德曼敦促消除这种做法，理由是只有它才能解决“物理学对形而上学的不确定性”，他们声称将任何假定的客观承诺减少到仅是“替代”形式的现实主义。然而，很少有人与弗伦奇和拉德曼一起承认存在这种不确定性，或者将如此严重的后果归咎于它。然而，另一种观点认为物理学确实制裁对象，尽管只是作为本体论的次要实体，代表了一条不同的、看似不那么极端的路线，可以得出关于结构基本性的相同结论。但是，由于“本体论先验”的含义本身就是一个棘手的哲学问题，因此在评估其前景之前，我们必须采取一种立场，即我们将如何理解优先级。在较早的一篇论文中，我概述了 Fine 的本体论依赖概念可以如何用于捍卫基于优先级的结构主义方法。然而，从那以后，我开始相信本体论依赖毕竟不是一种优先关系。因此，该文件中概述的论点需要重新评估。在这项工作中，我考虑了用决心的习语表达的基于优先级的结构主义的前景。我的结论是，它尚未得到我们最好的物理理论的证实，因为对称结构无法确定世界上基本种类的清单。然而，同样的对称性考虑表明消除主义有新的前景——而且，一种消除主义比迄今为止与 OSR 相关的更具自然主义吸引力。1. 介绍 2. 结构主义策略3。定义本体优先级：依赖还是决定？ 4．决定性习语中的结构主义 4.1。确定复数4.2。5. 确定种类属性 重新焕发活力的消除主义 介绍 定义本体论优先级的结构主义策略：依赖还是决定？决定性习语中的结构主义 4.1。确定复数4.2。