Real-time location systems are often required in industrial applications. In addition to securely determining an item's location, these systems also need to accommodate energy-limited tracking tokens. Distance-bounding protocols enable a Verifier to cryptographically determine an upper-bound on the physical distance to a Prover by measuring the round-trip time of specially designed challenge-response messages. This type of protocols serve as countermeasure to three common attacks on location-based systems and have been extensively studied with the goal of achieving optimal security bounds for the respective attacks. In this paper, we propose a new energy-efficient distance-bounding protocol that protects against all three common attacks in a distance-bounding scenario with improved security bounds. We provide a new approach to combining the response registers and Prover's key to determine responses. Furthermore, the protocol design allows offline pre-computation of the function $f$f used to determine the Prover's response registers. This results in faster protocol execution, the reader does not wait for the tag to compute any cryptographic function during the protocol execution, and also allows passive tokens to effectively use residual energy after the preceding transaction to compute response registers for the next protocol run.

中文翻译：

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具有剩余电荷计算的节能距离边界

工业应用中通常需要实时定位系统。除了安全地确定物品的位置之外，这些系统还需要适应能量有限的跟踪令牌。距离边界协议使验证者能够通过测量专门设计的质询-响应消息的往返时间，以加密方式确定到证明者的物理距离的上限。这种类型的协议可作为针对基于位置的系统的三种常见攻击的对策，并且已被广泛研究，目的是为各个攻击实现最佳安全界限。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的节能距离边界协议，该协议可以在具有改进的安全边界的距离边界场景中抵御所有三种常见攻击。我们提供了一种新方法来组合响应寄存器和证明者的密钥来确定响应。此外，协议设计允许功能的离线预计算$f$F用于确定证明者的响应寄存器。这导致更快的协议执行，阅读器在协议执行期间不会等待标签计算任何加密函数，并且还允许被动令牌有效地使用前一事务之后的剩余能量来计算下一次协议运行的响应寄存器。