Abstract Truck Appointment System (TAS) is a very common IT system used by marine container ports. At multi-terminal ports, each terminal normally operates its TAS independently, and there is a lack of coordination on how time slots are allocated to trucks across TASs. This is one of the major reasons for truck congestions in port hinterland areas. In this study, a concept of Tradable Truck Permit(TTP), which is adapted from the early idea of Traffic Bottleneck Permit in urban traffic management, is introduced to coordinate the TASs operated by different terminals located in the same port. To further improve the utilisation of TTP, a game theoretical framework is developed to investigate the exchange of TTPs across terminals. The framework includes a centralised decision making mode for perfect collaboration and a decentralised decision making mode for contract-based collaboration. The centralised mode is used for benchmarking the performance of the contract in the decentralised decision making mode. It has been found that a bilateral buy-back contract can coordinate the exchange of TTPs. In other words, even when the decision on permit exchange is made by each terminal independently, the buy-back contact can generate the same amount of profits as perfect collaboration does as long as the parameters in the contract are set properly.

中文翻译：

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多终端口岸可交易卡车许可证交换的最优​​合同设计

摘要 货车预约系统（TAS）是海运集装箱港口非常常用的IT系统。在多终端港口，每个终端通常独立运行其 TAS，并且在如何为跨 TAS 的卡车分配时隙方面缺乏协调。这是造成港口腹地地区货车拥堵的主要原因之一。在本研究中，从早期城市交通管理中交通瓶颈许可证的概念改编而来的可交易卡车许可证（TTP）的概念被引入，以协调位于同一港口的不同码头运营的 TAS。为了进一步提高 TTP 的利用率，开发了一个博弈理论框架来研究跨终端的 TTP 交换。该框架包括完美协作的集中决策模式和基于合同的协作的分散决策模式。中心化模式用于对去中心化决策模式下的合约绩效进行对标。已经发现双边回购合同可以协调 TTP 的交换。换句话说，即使每个终端独立做出许可交换的决定，只要合同中的参数设置得当，回购联系人也可以产生与完美协作相同数量的利润。已经发现双边回购合同可以协调 TTP 的交换。换句话说，即使每个终端独立做出许可交换的决定，只要合同中的参数设置得当，回购联系人也可以产生与完美协作相同数量的利润。已经发现双边回购合同可以协调 TTP 的交换。换句话说，即使每个终端独立做出许可交换的决定，只要合同中的参数设置得当，回购联系人也可以产生与完美协作相同数量的利润。