Resistive Random-Access Memory (ReRAM) devices have caught significant research attention as scalable nonvolatile memory technology for high-density data storage in 3-D crossbar architectures. ReRAM devices can switch with low programming voltages (<±1 V) at fast time-scales (≍10–100 ns) that make them an attractive option for not only off-chip data storage but also for on-chip embedded memory applications. ReRAM devices have also been explored for applications as reconfigurable switches in field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). The random variabilities in the switching performance of ReRAM has been exploited to design Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for hardware authentication, trust, and security. However, intrinsic vulnerabilities in ReRAM devices and its implications are not well-understood. Therefore, there is an urgent need to understand these so that the ReRAM-based circuits can be made robust against such attacks. This paper discusses our research on understanding the vulnerabilities in ReRAM through experimental studies and its implications on ReRAM based PUF operations. The Process, Voltage, Temperature (PVT) variabilities in ReRAM is experimentally studied and modeled. Some other ReRAM specific vulnerabilities, such as insertion of parasitic capacitances and Trojans by adversaries and its impact on ReRAM switching behavior is discussed. Based on experimental studies, models are created to capture these behaviors in ReRAM. Using these models, a 1 KB array of ReRAM devices in a crossbar architecture and its behavior is simulated. The challenge–response pairs of these ReRAM-based arrays were studied under ideal Trojan free conditions as well as with vulnerabilities models of ReRAM. Potential solutions are then proposed to make the PUF architecture and ReRAM devices more resistant to these vulnerabilities.

中文翻译：

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基于 ReRAM 的 PUF 和内存逻辑的漏洞和可靠性

电阻式随机存取存储器 (ReRAM) 设备作为可扩展的非易失性存储器技术，用于 3-D 交叉架构中的高密度数据存储，引起了广泛的研究关注。ReRAM 器件可以在快速时间尺度 (≍10–100 ns) 下以低编程电压 (<±1 V) 进行切换，这使其成为片外数据存储和片上嵌入式存储器应用的有吸引力的选择。还探索了 ReRAM 设备作为现场可编程门阵列 (FPGA) 中的可重新配置开关的应用。ReRAM 切换性能的随机变量已被用于设计物理不可克隆功能 (PUF)，用于硬件身份验证、信任和安全。然而，ReRAM 设备的内在漏洞及其影响尚不清楚。所以，迫切需要了解这些，以便基于 ReRAM 的电路能够抵御此类攻击。本文讨论了我们通过实验研究了解 ReRAM 漏洞的研究及其对基于 ReRAM 的 PUF 操作的影响。对 ReRAM 中的工艺、电压、温度 (PVT) 变量进行了实验研究和建模。讨论了其他一些 ReRAM 特定漏洞，例如对手插入寄生电容和木马及其对 ReRAM 切换行为的影响。基于实验研究，创建了模型来捕获 ReRAM 中的这些行为。使用这些模型，可以模拟交叉架构中的 1 KB ReRAM 设备阵列及其行为。在理想的无特洛伊木马条件以及 ReRAM 的漏洞模型下研究了这些基于 ReRAM 的阵列的挑战-响应对。然后提出了潜在的解决方案，使 PUF 架构和 ReRAM 设备更能抵抗这些漏洞。