Abstract To explore the impacts of trade credit on the pricing decisions of complementary product manufacturers, we establish a Bertrand model of two-echelon supply chains. Such a supply chain consists of two duopolistic suppliers that provide complementary products to a monopolistic retailer in three scenarios: 1) no supplier extends trade credit, 2) only one supplier extends trade credit, and 3) both suppliers extend trade credit. We find that the impacts of trade credit on the profit of each supply chain member are dependent on the difference in the opportunity cost between the upstream suppliers that extend trade credit and the downstream retailer. If the value is negative, one supplier will increase its profit by extending trade credit, thereby enhancing the profits of the other supplier and the retailer simultaneously. Further, if the value is negative, both suppliers adopting trade credit will provide more benefits to the whole supply than only single supplier adopting it. On the contrary, if the value is positive, no party extending trade credit will benefit all participants the most.

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贸易信贷对互补产品定价决策的影响

摘要 为了探讨贸易信贷对互补产品制造商定价决策的影响，我们建立了两级供应链的 Bertrand 模型。这样的供应链由两个双头垄断供应商组成，它们在三种情况下向垄断零售商提供互补产品：1) 没有供应商提供贸易信贷，2) 只有一个供应商提供贸易信贷，以及 3) 两个供应商都提供贸易信贷。我们发现贸易信贷对每个供应链成员利润的影响取决于提供贸易信贷的上游供应商与下游零售商之间机会成本的差异。如果该值为负，一个供应商将通过扩大贸易信贷来增加其利润，从而同时提高另一个供应商和零售商的利润。更多，如果值为负，则采用贸易信贷的两个供应商都比仅采用贸易信贷的单一供应商为整个供应提供更多利益。相反，如果该值为正，则没有一方提供贸易信贷将使所有参与者受益最大。