Computing-in-memory (CIM) is proposed to alleviate the processor-memory data transfer bottleneck in traditional Von-Neumann architectures, and spintronics-based magnetic memory has demonstrated many facilitation in implementing CIM paradigm. Since hardware security has become one of the major concerns in circuit designs, this paper, for the first time, investigates spin-based computing-in-memory (SpinCIM) from a security perspective. We focus on two fundamental questions: 1) how the new SpinCIM computing paradigm can be exploited to enhance hardware security? 2) what security concerns has this new SpinCIM computing paradigm incurred?

中文翻译：

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基于自旋的内存计算中的硬件安全性：分析、利用和缓解技术

提出了内存计算 (CIM) 来缓解传统冯诺依曼架构中的处理器内存数据传输瓶颈，基于自旋电子学的磁内存在实现 CIM 范式方面表现出许多便利。由于硬件安全已成为电路设计中的主要问题之一，本文首次从安全角度研究了基于自旋的内存计算 (SpinCIM)。我们关注两个基本问题：1) 如何利用新的 SpinCIM 计算范式来增强硬件安全性？2) 这种新的 SpinCIM 计算范式引起了哪些安全问题？