The detection of radioxenon isotopes from an underground nuclear test using the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is complicated by a radioxenon background, largely originating from the civil radioxenon emissions of medical isotope production facilities and nuclear power plant reactors. Much of the background is measured as single isotopes near the detection threshold, limiting the use of isotopic ratios which could differentiate between the possible sources. Here we introduce the UK Radionuclide National Data Centre methodology to approach the problem of radioxenon detections and source identification. Using automated analysis of radiometric data and atmospheric transport simulations, the detectability of radioxenon isotopes $${^{133}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 133 Xe , $${^{131\mathrm{m}}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 131 m Xe , $${^{133\mathrm{m}}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 133 m Xe and $${^{135}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 135 Xe from North Korea is estimated for the Takasaki radionuclide station JPX38, and the possibility of detecting $${^{133}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 133 Xe from selected locations across the Korean Peninsula and extended region is investigated.

中文翻译：

---

对朝鲜半岛放射性氙检测的思考

使用《全面禁止核试验条约》的国际监测系统从地下核试验中检测放射性氙同位素由于放射性氙背景而变得复杂，主要来自医用同位素生产设施和核电站反应堆的民用放射性氙排放。大部分背景被测量为检测阈值附近的单一同位素，限制了使用同位素比率来区分可能的来源。在这里，我们介绍了英国放射性核素国家数据中心方法来解决放射性氙检测和源识别问题。使用辐射测量数据和大气传输模拟的自动分析，放射性氙同位素的可探测性 $${^{133}\hbox {Xe}}$$ 133 Xe , $${^{131\mathrm{m}}\hbox {Xe }}$$ 1.31亿氙，