In 1986 the author wrote a paper about tax compliance that theorized that the output of tax inspectors would be constrained by the rate of evasion of tax payments. That paper was never subsequently cited in the literature on transit fare evasion, which presumed that ticket inspection had a simple unidirectional effect on evasion. This current paper argues that all subsequent models of the economic link between fare evasion and ticket inspection overlook the possibility of a bidirectional relationship between the two. The 1986 paper further argued that multiple equilibrium levels of evasion versus inspection might be found to exist, and that evasion could therefore possibly theoretically be tipped from one level to another. This current paper suggests that the periodic concentrated deployment of inspectors might be a novel enforcement strategy that takes advantage of this phenomenon. The paper concludes with suggestions for the deceptive manipulation of passengers’ perceptions of the probability of being detected as a fare evader.

1986年，作者写了一篇关于税收合规的论文，理论上认为，逃税率会限制税务检查员的产出。该论文随后在有关过境票价逃逸的文献中从未被引用过，后者认为票务检查对逃逸具有简单的单向影响。本文认为，所有随后的逃票和票务检查之间的经济联系模型都忽略了两者之间双向关系的可能性。1986年的论文进一步指出，可能存在逃避与检查的多重均衡水平，因此，从理论上讲，逃避可能从一个水平倾斜到另一个水平。本文认为，定期集中部署检查员可能是利用这种现象的一种新颖的执行策略。本文最后提出了一些欺骗性建议，以欺骗性方式操纵乘客对被发现为逃票行为的可能性的看法。