Abstract We propose a cooperative evolution model in which successive behaviors influence reputation. There are two mechanisms to form reputation. One is enhancing the reputation of players who cooperate insistently, and reducing it when they defect continuously. The other is increasing reputation when defection is transformed into cooperation, and decreasing when cooperation is turned into defection. These two reputation formation mechanisms are simulated on the weak prisoner's dilemma game. We use a weighted average Fermi equation to describe the probability of players learning the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor. The results show that, under these two mechanisms, both the reward for reputation and emphasis on it have an impact on the cooperation. We find that encouraging “C after C” is better for cooperation than encouraging “C after D”, when people attach importance to reputation to a certain extent. Before reaching that threshold, however, encouraging “C after D” is better when reputation reward is large.

中文翻译：

---

基于声誉和连续行为的社会困境

摘要 我们提出了一种合作进化模型，其中连续的行为会影响声誉。声誉的形成有两种机制。一是提高坚持合作的玩家的声誉，并降低他们不断叛逃的声誉。另一个是变卖为合作的名气增加，而合作为背叛的名声下降。这两种声誉形成机制是在弱囚徒困境博弈中模拟的。我们使用加权平均费米方程来描述玩家学习随机选择的邻居策略的概率。结果表明，在这两种机制下，对声誉的奖励和对声誉的重视都会对合作产生影响。我们发现，当人们在一定程度上重视声誉时，鼓励“C after C”比鼓励“C after D”更有利于合作。然而，在达到该阈值之前，当声誉奖励较大时，鼓励“C after D”更好。