Equilibrium in a two-sided market represented by network platforms on the plane and heterogeneous agents is investigated. The advocated approach is based on the duopoly model which implies a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and examines the agents’ heterogeneous utility with the Hotelling specification. The exact values were found for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly in a two-sided market with two platforms on the plane. The dependence of the platforms’ benefits on network externalities was investigated. The problem of the optimal location of platforms in the market was considered.

中文翻译：

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两层平台市场上Hotelling的双头垄断

研究了以平面网络平台和异构代理为代表的双向市场中的均衡。倡导的方法基于双头垄断模型，该模型意味着在市场的每一端都有数量有限的代理商的连续体，并根据Hotelling规范检查代理商的异类效用。对于在平面上有两个平台的双向市场中的双头垄断，可以找到平衡的精确值。研究了平台收益对网络外部性的依赖性。考虑了平台在市场中的最佳位置的问题。