This paper introduces and demonstrates two new attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks are based on random number generators with compromised security. First we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of both Alice's and Bob's random number generators. We show that in this situation Eve can crack the secure key bit within a fraction of the bit exchange period even if her current and voltage measurements have only a single bit of resolution. In the second attack, we explore the situation in which Eve knows the seed of only Alice's random number generator. We show that in this situation Eve can still crack the secure key bit but she needs to use the whole bit exchange period for the attack. The security of the KLJN key exchange scheme, similarly to other protocols, necessitates that the random number generator outputs are truly random for Eve.

中文翻译：

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针对 Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise 安全密钥交换协议的随机数生成器攻击

本文介绍并演示了两种针对基尔霍夫定律约翰逊噪声 (KLJN) 安全密钥交换方案的新攻击。这些攻击基于安全性受损的随机数生成器。首先我们探讨 Eve 知道 Alice 和 Bob 的随机数生成器的种子的情况。我们表明，在这种情况下，即使她的电流和电压测量只有一位分辨率，Eve 也可以在比特交换周期的一小部分内破解安全密钥位。在第二次攻击中，我们探讨了 Eve 只知道 Alice 的随机数生成器的种子的情况。我们表明，在这种情况下，Eve 仍然可以破解安全密钥位，但她需要使用整个位交换周期来进行攻击。KLJN 密钥交换方案的安全性，与其他协议类似，