Abstract

In this article, we study the influences of manufacturer rebate on the outcomes of the channel members in a green supply chain, where the retailer has private information about market demand. We find that, (1) manufacturer rebate is good for the channel members, however, the manufacturer takes a lower share of the incremental profit than the retailer; (2) the value of manufacturer rebate for the channel members increases as the promotion frequency and the slippage effect increase. Then, we extend the models to the cases with information sharing and simultaneous game mode, respectively. The results show that, (1) information sharing benefits the manufacturer, but does not necessarily hurt the retailer; (2) a suitable manufacturer rebate strategy will promote the retailer to share the demand information; (3) the first-mover advantage of manufacturer benefits himself, but hurts the retailer and the channel.

摘要

在本文中，我们研究了制造商回扣对绿色供应链中渠道成员结果的影响，在绿色供应链中，零售商拥有有关市场需求的私人信息。我们发现，（1）制造商回扣对渠道成员有利，但是制造商在增量利润中所占的份额低于零售商；（2）随着促销频率和打滑效应的增加，渠道成员的制造商​​回扣值也增加。然后，我们将模型分别扩展到具有信息共享和同时游戏模式的案例。结果表明：（1）信息共享使制造商受益，但并不一定损害零售商；（2）适当的制造商回扣策略将促进零售商共享需求信息；