This paper proposes a methodological redirection of the philosophical debate on artificial moral agency (AMA) in view of increasingly pressing practical needs due to technological development. This “normative approach” suggests abandoning theoretical discussions about what conditions may hold for moral agency and to what extent these may be met by artificial entities such as AI systems and robots. Instead, the debate should focus on how and to what extent such entities should be included in human practices normally assuming moral agency and responsibility of participants. The proposal is backed up by an analysis of the AMA debate, which is found to be overly caught in the opposition between so-called standard and functionalist conceptions of moral agency, conceptually confused and practically inert. Additionally, we outline some main themes of research in need of attention in light of the suggested normative approach to AMA.

中文翻译：

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人工道德代理的规范方法

鉴于技术发展带来的日益紧迫的实际需求，本文提出了关于人工道德代理 (AMA) 的哲学辩论的方法论重定向。这种“规范方法”建议放弃关于道德代理可能具备的条件以及人工智能系统和机器人等人工实体在多大程度上可以满足这些条件的理论讨论。相反，辩论应该集中在这些实体应该如何以及在多大程度上被包含在通常承担参与者的道德主体和责任的人类实践中。该提议得到了对 AMA 辩论的分析的支持，该辩论被发现过度陷入所谓的道德能动性的标准和功能主义概念之间的对立，概念上混乱且实际上是惰性的。此外，