We propose an extended spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) model to study the dynamics of individual career choice and the corresponding social output. Based on the social value orientation theory, we study the game dynamics of players choosing from two types of work, namely the public work if it serves public interests, and the private work if it serves personal interests. Under the context of SEPGG, choosing public work is to cooperate and choosing private work is to defect. We then investigate the effects of employee productivity, human capital and external subsidies on individual career choices of the two work types, as well as the overall social welfare. From simulation results, we found that when employees have low productivity, they are more willing to enter the private sector. Although this will make both the effort level and human capital of individuals doing private work higher than those engaging in public work, the total outcome of the private sector is still lower than that of the public sector with a low level of public subsidies. When the employee productivity is higher for public work, a certain amount of subsidy can greatly improve system output. On the contrary, when employees in the public sector have low productivity, increasing the subsidy can result in a decline in social output.

我们提出了一个扩展的空间进化公共物品博弈模型（SEPGG），以研究个人职业选择和相应社会产出的动态。基于社会价值取向理论，我们研究了从两种类型的工作中进行选择的玩家的博弈动力，即为公共利益服务的公共工作和为个人利益服务的私人工作。在SEPGG的背景下，选择公共工作是合作，选择私人工作是缺陷。然后，我们调查员工生产率，人力资本和外部补贴对两种工作类型的个人职业选择以及总体社会福利的影响。根据仿真结果，我们发现，当员工的生产率低下时，他们更愿意进入私营部门。尽管这将使从事私人工作的个人的努力水平和人力资本高于从事公共工作的个人，但私营部门的总产出仍低于公共补贴水平较低的公共部门。当员工的公共工作效率更高时，一定数量的补贴可以大大提高系统的产出。相反，当公共部门的雇员生产率低下时，增加补贴可能会导致社会产出下降。