On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed.

中文翻译：

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内在的、外在的和先验的构成

在我所谓的物理形式主义数学哲学的基础上，我将对康德-赖兴巴赫的先验构成概念进行修正。将证明归属于真实对象的特征（属性、品质、特性）并不作为“自在之物”被对象所拥有；它们需要一个物理理论来构成这些特征。可以看出，这样一个物理理论的存在意味着一个物理对象只有在其他偶然存在的物理对象存在的情况下才能拥有属性；因此，内在与外在的区别是有缺陷的。