ABSTRACT

We consider a fresh-product supply chain (FPSC) in which the supplier and the e-tailer invest in quality-improvement effort and fresh-keeping effort, respectively. One centralized model and two decentralized models are developed to investigate the optimal effort and pricing decisions for double-effort (de), quality-improvement effort only (qe), fresh-keeping effort only (fe) and none effort (ne) strategies, respectively. We also conduct a comparative analysis to find out the superiority among four different strategies, to reveal the effect of different power structures, and to show the distortion of effort decisions. Our research reveals several insights. First, we find that the de strategy is a dominant strategy for both the supplier and the e-tailer. Second, although channel power structures have a significant impact on the effort decisions, it neither guarantees a greater effort nor more profit for the FPSC. Third, the optimal quality-improvement effort and fresh-keeping effort are always distorted in a decentralized setting, and the channel efficiency is lost the most under a de strategy. Finally, we propose the net-revenue and cost sharing contract and the two-part tariff contract to coordinate this decentralized FPSC. We further demonstrate several sensitivity effects based on computational studies, providing additional insights for better understanding the theoretical results.

摘要

我们考虑一个新鲜产品供应链（FPSC），其中供应商和电子零售商分别在质量改善工作和保鲜工作上进行投资。开发了一个集中式模型和两个分散式模型，以研究双重努力（de），仅质量改进努力（qe），仅保鲜努力（fe）和不付出努力（ne）策略。我们还进行了比较分析，以找出四种不同策略之间的优势，以揭示不同权力结构的影响，并显示努力决策的失真。我们的研究揭示了一些见解。首先，我们发现de策略对于供应商和电子零售商都是主导策略。其次，尽管渠道权力结构对工作量决定有重大影响，但它既不能保证FPSC付出更大的努力，也不能保证更多的利润。三，优化软件质量的提高和保鲜的努力总是扭曲，分散设置，信道效率失去了在最DE战略。最后，我们提出了净收入和成本分摊合同以及由两部分组成的关税合同，以协调该分散的FPSC。我们进一步基于计算研究证明了几种灵敏度效应，为更好地理解理论结果提供了更多见解。