I applaud the ambition and optimism with which the authors lay out their case for a “single, coherent explanation of consciousness” that can unite GW, HOT and illusionism into a “standard model” based on their Attention Schema Theory (AST). I think they are basically right, and although I have some misgivings about a few of their ways of putting things, and think they underestimate the scope and complexity of their own theory, in the spirit of advancing their project, I will devote most of my commentary to adding what I take to be friendly amendments and clarifications. I will highlight the themes I find most important. “Iconsciousness is what the brain actually has; m-consciousness is what the brain thinks that it has.” (p. 13) Yes, i-consciousness is the dynamic informational system that is physically realized in the brain (in one variety of global workspace or another), and that accounts for all the behaviours, talents and dispositions that persuade us that an organism is conscious in one way or another. Chalmers’ “easy problems” (Chalmers, 1995) are all solved or solvable in a developed theory of i-consciousness. But it is somewhat misleading to say that the brain thinks that it has m-consciousness; only (the brains of) people – and particularly reflective people – think that they have m-consciousness. Dogs’ brains have i-consciousness systems similar in many regards to those in our brains – they have attention-systems controlled by competitive sub-assemblies that determine what gets enhanced when – but their brains don’t generate the theorists’ illusion that our brains do, primarily because dogs don’t ever learn to compare notes with their conspecifics, to communicate about what is going on in their brains. Dogs presumably do not think there is something it is like to be them, even if there is. It is not that a dog thinks there isn’t anything it is like to be a dog; the dog is not a theorist at all, and hence does not suffer from the theorists’ illusion. The hard problem and meta-problem are only problems for us humans, and mainly just for those of us humans who are particularly reflective. In other words, dogs aren’t bothered or botherable by problem intuitions. Dogs – and, for that matter, clams and ticks and bacteria – do enjoy (or at any rate benefit from) a sort of user illusion: they are equipped to discriminate and track only some of the properties in their environment. (Dennett, 2019, p. 54)

中文翻译：

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正在向标准模型迈进

我赞赏作者提出的“单一、连贯的意识解释”的雄心和乐观态度，这种解释可以将 GW、HOT 和幻觉结合到一个基于注意力模式理论 (AST) 的“标准模型”中。我认为他们基本上是对的，尽管我对他们的一些放置方式有些疑虑，并且认为他们低估了自己理论的范围和复杂性，但本着推进他们的项目的精神，我将投入我的大部分精力添加我认为是友好的修正和澄清的评论。我将突出我认为最重要的主题。“无意识是大脑实际拥有的；m-意识是大脑认为它拥有的东西。” （第 13 页）是的，i-意识是在大脑中物理实现的动态信息系统（在各种全球工作空间或其他），它解释了说服我们有机体以某种方式有意识的所有行为、才能和性格. 查尔默斯的“简单问题”（查尔默斯，1995 年）都可以在发展的 i-意识理论中解决或解决。但说大脑认为它有 m 意识，这有点误导；只有（大脑）人——尤其是反思性的人——认为他们有移动意识。狗的大脑有很多与我们大脑相似的意识系统——它们的注意力系统由竞争性子组件控制，决定什么时候增强——但它们的大脑不会产生理论家的错觉，即我们的大脑这样做，主要是因为狗永远不会学会与它们的同类比较笔记，以交流他们大脑中发生的事情。狗大概不认为有什么像他们一样，即使有。并不是一只狗认为没有什么就像做一只狗一样；狗根本不是理论家，因此不会受到理论家的幻觉的影响。难题和元问题只是我们人类的问题，主要是我们这些特别反思的人的问题。换句话说，狗不会被问题直觉所困扰或困扰。狗——以及，就此而言，蛤蜊、蜱虫和细菌——确实享受（或至少受益于）一种用户错觉：它们有能力区分和跟踪环境中的一些特性。（丹尼特，2019 年，第 54 页）