What Graziano and colleagues describe as the “attention schema” really is one special case of what I have called the “phenomenal model of the intentionality relation” (PMIR) since 1993 (Metzinger, 2003; chap. 6; Metzinger, 1993, 2000, 2005, 2006; Metzinger & Gallese, 2003). For example, we also find PMIRs in motor selection and consciously experienced volition (“the self in the act of selecting an action goal”; cf. Metzinger, 2006) as well as in high-level cognitive selfcontrol (“the thinking self in the act of grasping a concept”; cf. Metzinger, 2005). My central point was that the classical intentionality relation (as introduced by Franz Brentano in 1874) can itself form the content of a conscious mental representation, because human brains are intentionality-modelling systems. If you will, we have and constantly use “intentionality schemata” (and not only an “attention schema”), and on the level of conscious processing such models generate what we later call the firstperson perspective—a representation of the whole organism as directed at a perceptual target, at abstract symbolic content, or a goal state. In beings like us, there sometimes exists a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation itself. We have, as it were, the capacity to “catch ourselves in the act”: At times we have higher-order conscious representations of ourselves as representing. This can, for example, create a model of the self in the act of attending and of the ability to control the focus of attention. I have called this special case “attentional agency” elsewhere (e.g., Metzinger, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2017). Graziano and colleagues importantly point out how such models of subject/object relations form a potential bridge for social cognition and mind reading (Graziano, Guterstam, Bio, & Wilterson, 2019, p. 10). I fully agree with this. Attention schemata can be shared, dynamically coupled, and coordinated among agents, and sometimes this very process can itself be consciously experienced. In Metzinger, 2005 (figure 4) I have depicted such a configuration, Metzinger, 2006 (p. 30, figure 2.5b) explains the sameprinciple not for attention, but for volition: In other-agent modelling,we can also represent intentions and action goals in our social environment. Interestingly, it is empirically plausible that this process has unconscious functional precursors in the motor system, for example in embedded motor schemata and the coding of effector-target relations (Metzinger & Gallese, 2003). Evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. One may therefore speculate that, under an evolutionary perspective, there may be common unconscious precursors interestingly linking Graziano’s attention schema and the PMIR tomotor control and the embodied simulation of other agents (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011).

中文翻译：

---

自建模认知空间和收缩原理

Graziano 及其同事所描述的“注意模式”实际上是自 1993 年以来我称之为“意向性关系的现象模型”（PMIR）的一个特例（Metzinger，2003；第 6 章；Metzinger，1993，2000， 2005, 2006; Metzinger & Gallese, 2003)。例如，我们还在运动选择和有意识体验的意志（“选择行动目标的行为中的自我”；参见 Metzinger，2006）以及高级认知自我控制（“思考中的自我”）中发现 PMIR。理解概念的行为”；参见 Metzinger，2005 年）。我的中心观点是经典的意向性关系（如弗朗茨·布伦塔诺（Franz Brentano）于 1874 年引入的）本身可以形成有意识的心理表征的内容，因为人类大脑是意向性建模系统。如果你愿意，我们拥有并不断使用“意向图式”（而不仅仅是“注意图式”），并且在意识处理的水平上，此类模型产生了我们后来称为第一人称的观点——针对感知目标的整个有机体的表示，在抽象的符号内容，或目标状态。在像我们这样的存在者中，有时存在意向性关系本身的现象模型。可以说，我们有能力“在行动中抓住自己”：有时，我们有更高阶的意识表征，将自己视为表征。例如，这可以创建一个自我参与行为和控制注意力焦点的能力的模型。我在其他地方将这种特殊情况称为“注意力机构”（例如，Metzinger，2003、2006、2013、2017）。Graziano 及其同事重要地指出，这种主体/客体关系模型如何为社会认知和读心术搭建起潜在的桥梁（Graziano、Guterstam、Bio 和 Wilterson，2019 年，第 10 页）。我完全同意这一点。注意力模式可以在代理之间共享、动态耦合和协调，有时这个过程本身可以被有意识地体验。在 Metzinger, 2005（图 4）中，我描述了这样的配置，Metzinger, 2006（第 30 页，图 2.5b）解释了同样的原则，不是为了注意力，而是为了意志：在其他代理建模中，我们也可以表示意图和我们社会环境中的行动目标。有趣的是，这个过程在运动系统中具有无意识的功能前体，这在经验上是合理的，例如在嵌入式运动模式和效应器-目标关系的编码中 (Metzinger & Gallese, 2003)。证据表明，大脑根据生物体-对象-关系的多模态表示来模拟运动和行动目标。因此，人们可能会推测，从进化的角度来看，可能存在共同的无意识前兆，有趣地将 Graziano 的注意力模式和 PMIR 运动控制以及其他代理的具身模拟联系起来（Gallese & Sinigaglia，2011）。