Recently, the discussion regarding the consequences of cutting the corpus callosum (“split-brain”) has regained momentum (Corballis, Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, Brain, 141(6), e46, 2018; Pinto et al., Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237, 2017a; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, Brain, 140(11), e68, 2017; Volz & Gazzaniga, Brain, 140(7), 2051–2060, 2017; Volz, Hillyard, Miller, & Gazzaniga, Brain, 141(3), e15, 2018). This collective review paper aims to summarize the empirical common ground, to delineate the different interpretations, and to identify the remaining questions. In short, callosotomy leads to a broad breakdown of functional integration ranging from perception to attention. However, the breakdown is not absolute as several processes, such as action control, seem to remain unified. Disagreement exists about the responsible mechanisms for this remaining unity. The main issue concerns the first-person perspective of a split-brain patient. Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, and different suggestions are made with respect to how future studies might address this paucity. In addition, it is suggested that the answers might not be a simple yes or no but that intermediate conceptualizations need to be considered.

中文翻译：

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脑裂：我们现在所知道的，以及为什么这对于理解意识很重要。

最近，关于削减call体（“裂脑”）后果的讨论重新获得了动力（Corballis，Corballis，Berlucchi和Marzi，Brain，141（6），e46，2018； Pinto等，Brain， 140（5），1231–1237，2017a; Pinto，Lamme，＆de Haan，Brain，140（11），e68，2017; Volz＆Gazzaniga，Brain，140（7），2051-2060，2017; Volz，Hillyard ，米勒（Miller）和加扎尼加（Gazzaniga），布恩（Brain）141（3），e15，2018年）。这份集体审查论文旨在总结经验上的共同点，描述不同的解释，并确定其余的问题。简而言之，骨切开术导致从知觉到注意力的功能整合的广泛崩溃。但是，细分并不是绝对的，因为动作控制等几个过程似乎保持统一。关于维持这种统一的负责机制存在分歧。主要问题涉及裂脑患者的第一人称视角。裂脑是否包含分裂意识或意识是统一的？当前的共识是证据不足以回答这个问题，并且就未来的研究如何解决这一不足提出了不同的建议。此外，