This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999 ; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001 ). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show that its limit is an inessential game. Three axioms (associated consistency, inessential game, continuity) characterize a unique sharing rule. Combinatorial arguments and matrix tools provide a procedure to compute the solution. The new sharing rule coincides with the Shapley value when the communication is complete.

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相关的一致性、价值和图表

本文提出了具有不完全通信的合作博弈新价值的公理化特征。结果是通过对 Hamiache 提出的相关博弈稍加修改而获得的（Games Econ Behav 26:59-78, 1999 ; Int J Game Theory 30:279-289, 2001）。这种新的关联博弈可以表示为矩阵公式。我们生成了一系列连续的相关博弈，并表明其极限是一个无关紧要的博弈。三个公理（相关一致性、非本质博弈、连续性）表征了一个独特的共享规则。组合参数和矩阵工具提供了计算解决方案的过程。当通信完成时，新的共享规则与 Shapley 值一致。