In two-sided markets with transferable utility (‘assignment games’), we study the dynamics of trade arrangements and price adjustments as agents from the two market sides stochastically match, break up, and re-match in their pursuit of better opportunities. The underlying model of individual adjustments is based on the behavioral theories of adaptive learning and aspiration adjustment. Dynamics induced by this model converge to approximately optimal and stable market outcomes, but this convergence may be (exponentially) slow. We introduce the notion of a ‘market sentiment’ that governs which of the two market sides is temporarily more or less amenable to price adjustments, and show that such a feature may significantly speed up convergence.

中文翻译：

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去中心化分配经济中的市场情绪和趋同动态

在具有可转移效用的双边市场（“分配博弈”）中，我们研究了贸易安排和价格调整的动态，因为来自两个市场双方的代理人在追求更好的机会时随机匹配、分解和重新匹配。个体调整的基本模型基于适应性学习和愿望调整的行为理论。该模型引起的动态收敛到近似最优和稳定的市场结果，但这种收敛可能（指数级）缓慢。我们引入了“市场情绪”的概念，该概念支配着两个市场方面中的哪一方暂时或多或少地适合价格调整，并表明这种特征可能会显着加快收敛速度​​。