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Influence in private-goods allocation
Journal of Mathematical Economics ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.04.001
Madhav Raghavan

Abstract We reinterpret the ‘bossiness’ of a private-goods allocation rule (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) as the ability of an agent to ‘influence’ another’s welfare with no change to her own welfare. In applications where non-bossiness is not possible, we propose simple conditions on (1) which agents may have influence (acyclicity and preservation), and (2) the welfare consequences of influence (positivity and oppositeness). We apply these conditions to three well-known bossy rules: the ‘Vickrey rule’ in single-object auctions (Vickrey, 1961) (acyclic, positive), the ‘doctor-optimal stable rule’ in matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) (acyclic, positive, preserving) and ‘generalised absorbing top-trading cycles (GATTC) rules’ in housing markets with indifferences in preferences (Aziz and Keijzer, 2011) (acyclic, opposite, preserving). Under mild restrictions, we show how the nature of influence under a strategy-proof rule determines whether or not it satisfies weak group-strategy-proofness (requires acyclicity and either positivity or preservation), weak Maskin monotonicity (acyclicity and positivity) and Pareto-efficiency (acyclicity and oppositeness). In addition, we propose an influence-related generalisation of the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism in school choice (Kesten, 2010), and characterise influence for strategy-proof GATTC rules in housing markets.

中文翻译:

对私人物品配置的影响

摘要 我们将私人物品分配规则(Satterthwaite 和 Sonnenschein,1981)的“老板”重新解释为代理人在不改变自己的福利的情况下“影响”他人福利的能力。在非老板不可能的应用中,我们提出了以下简单条件:(1)哪些代理可能有影响(非循环性和保存性),以及(2)影响的福利后果(积极性和相反性)。我们将这些条件应用于三个著名的专横规则:单一对象拍卖中的“维克里规则”(Vickrey,1961)(非循环,正),与合同匹配的“医生最优稳定规则”(Hatfield 和 Milgrom, 2005)(非循环、积极、保留)和“广义吸收顶部交易周期(GATTC)规则”在偏好无差异的情况下(Aziz 和 Keijzer,2011)(非循环,相反,保存)。在温和的限制下,我们展示了在策略证明规则下影响的性质如何决定它是否满足弱组策略证明(需要非循环性和正性或保存性)、弱 Maskin 单调性(非循环性和正性)和帕累托 -效率(非循环性和对立性)。此外,我们提出了学校选择中效率调整延迟接受机制的影响相关概括(Kesten,2010),并描述了住房市场中策略证明 GATTC 规则的影响。弱 Maskin 单调性(非循环性和正性)和帕累托效率(非循环性和相反性)。此外,我们提出了学校选择中效率调整延迟接受机制的影响相关概括(Kesten,2010),并描述了住房市场中策略证明 GATTC 规则的影响。弱 Maskin 单调性(非循环性和正性)和帕累托效率(非循环性和相反性)。此外,我们提出了学校选择中效率调整延迟接受机制的影响相关概括(Kesten,2010),并描述了住房市场中策略证明 GATTC 规则的影响。
更新日期:2020-08-01
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