Abstract Provisions for regionalization in the case of infectious diseases were included in the World Trade Organization in 1995, but after >20 years it has seen little uptake, primarily because importing countries have not accepted exporting countries' assurances regarding disease-free zones. Given the potential trade benefits, the failure to achieve acceptance for disease-free zones suggests revisiting regionalization. The current approach relies on physical barriers to the movement of infected animals or products taking no account of incentives. Restrictions on movement between infected and disease free areas lead to price declines in the infected area. Price disparity between the regions leads to an incentive for commercial and casual smuggling and, hence, the unwillingness to accept the disease free sub-national zone of the exporting country. This paper demonstrates that strict control and monitoring measures are unlikely to eliminate smuggling. A price support policy proposal is developed, which would remove the incentive to smuggle.

中文翻译：

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进口商的风险、走私和激励措施在动物疾病管理中的作用

摘要 世界贸易组织于 1995 年将传染病区域化的规定纳入了世界贸易组织，但在 20 多年后几乎没有得到采纳，主要是因为进口国没有接受出口国关于无病区的保证。鉴于潜在的贸易利益，无病区未能获得认可表明重新考虑区域化。当前的方法依赖于对受感染动物或产品移动的物理障碍，而不考虑激励措施。受感染地区和无疾病地区之间的流动限制导致受感染地区的价格下降。地区之间的价格差异导致商业和休闲走私的诱因，因此，不愿意接受出口国的无病次国家区。本文表明，严格的控制和监测措施不太可能消除走私。制定了价格支持政策建议，这将消除走私的动机。