In this paper, I argue that what counts as the proper function of a trait is a matter of the de facto perspective that the biological system, itself, possesses on what counts as proper functioning for that trait. Unlike non-perspectival accounts, internal perspectivalism does not succumb to generality problems. But unlike external perspectivalism, internal perspectivalism can provide a fully naturalistic, mind-independent grounding of proper function and natural norms. The attribution of perspectives to biological systems is intended to be neither metaphorical nor anthropomorphic: I do not mean to imply that such systems thereby must possess agency, cognition, intentions, concepts, or mental or psychological states. Instead, such systems provide the grounding for norms of performance when they internally enforce their own standard of (i.e., their own perspective on) what constitutes proper functioning or malfunctioning. By operating with a fixed, determinate level of generality, such systems provide the basis for an account of proper function that is immune to generality problems.

中文翻译：

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内部透视主义：关于适当功能和自然规范的一般性问题的解决方案

在这篇论文中，我认为什么算作一个性状的适当功能是一个事实上的观点，生物系统本身就拥有什么才是该性状的适当功能。与非透视性叙述不同，内部透视主义不会屈服于普遍性问题。但与外在视角主义不同，内在视角主义可以为适当的功能和自然规范提供完全自然主义的、独立于思想的基础。将视角归因于生物系统既不是隐喻也不是拟人化：我的意思不是暗示这样的系统必须具有能动性、认知、意图、概念或精神或心理状态。相反，当这些系统在内部执行他们自己的标准（即，他们自己的观点）什么构成了正常运作或故障。通过以固定的、确定的通用性级别运行，此类系统为对通用性问题免疫的正确功能的说明提供了基础。