The challenges faced by small organizations confronting illegal wildlife trade (IWT) networks can be large and frightening. In a context of high corruption, political instability and social upheaval, obtaining information about actor identities, connections and trade flows may come with risks to personal security. Yet it is precisely in these contexts that illegal wildlife trade may flourish, piggybacking on trade in other contraband items. In our recent work, we examined the hypothesis that such ‘parallel’ trafficking would dominate trade in a threatened, Neotropical finch, the Red Siskin (RS, Spinus cucullatus) in Venezuela (Sánchez‐Mercado et al., 2019). Venezuela’s economic situation has experienced historic declines since 2014: by 2017, ~ 87% of the population lived in poverty, and from 2013 – 2018, GDP fell over 45% (España & Ponce, 2017). We expected the lure of ‘hard’ foreign currency, combined with widespread lawlessness, to drive IWT in this bird, in parallel with other illicit items. In spite of these conditions, although we did find an active and complex RS trade network, we found little evidence for parallel trade, and instead found a network reliant on specialized logistical capacity for transport and enforcement evasion, as well as intermediaries with specialized skills. While this finding of an active network was not good news, the network structure we found presents unexpected opportunities for small organizations up against this trade challenge, particularly in a South American context.

We are grateful to Farine (2020), Tsang (2020) and Kahler (2020) for their generous and valuable insights about our study, and their careful note of caveats and recommendations for future work. For example, we agree that finding no evidence for parallel trade does not mean such trade does not exist. As Kahler (2020) and Tsang (2020) note, detection of parallel trade is not simple, though our failure to find evidence of it is likely due less to under reporting by interview subjects (who freely shared information about contacts), than to insufficient sampling effort, particularly among potential international colluders and intermediaries. However, parallel trafficking is just one way that an IWT network may operate, with its organized pyramidal structure, and fluxes dominated by monopolistic or power figures, as in the case of rhino, ivory, or tiger products. The structure of the Neotropical parrot trade network presents another such alternative (Pires, Schneider, & Herrera, 2016). Similar to their findings, we found little formal organization between or among actors. This modus operandi, although not exclusive to South American countries, may be driven by their general lack of environmental law enforcement: ordinary individuals may participate in IWT, with low risk and without need for organized crime groups. Thus, our lack of detection of parallel trade may reflect reality, and not just sampling bias.

The potential reality of a significant ‘specialized’ rather than parallel trade in RS is not only less frightening, it also opens an opportunity for small organizations to impact the IWT challenge. Although some breeders emerged as key modulators of RS network fluxes, we found no significant bottlenecks. This implies that the network could circulate not only birds, but also targeted information, focused on reducing the use of wild‐caught RS (Red Siskin Initiative, 2019). Understanding why key actors may prefer wild‐caught vs captive‐bred RS will be paramount for designing such information to circulate. Approaches from conservation psychology, such as the Theory of Planned Behavior, could be used to test hypotheses about behavioral factors (e.g. attitudes, social norms, perceived control) driving RS uses (Veríssimo et al., 2020). For example, wild RS use may be driven by ignorance of benign alternatives, such as captive‐bred birds (the ‘ignorance’ hypothesis), or by an insufficient supply of captive‐bred substitutes to meet demand (the ‘availability’ hypothesis). On the other hand, captive breeding may pose challenges that result in expensive captive‐bred specimens (the ‘costs’ hypothesis). Finally, overexploitation of wild birds may be driven by a belief that regularly ‘refreshing’ flocks with wild‐caught birds maintains genetic variability (the ‘refreshment’ hypothesis). Evaluating these hypotheses provides focus for future behavior change campaigns. If attitudes about genetic ‘refreshment’ explain significant variation in intention to use wild‐caught individuals, for example, then disseminating information about experiences using captive‐bred birds successfully may be appropriate, especially if combined with workshops to improve local breeding skills. Alternatively, if the ‘costs’ hypothesis has greater support, interventions aimed at reducing costs may be more effective.

However, while small organizations can be successful in mitigating IWT network impacts using the above‐described tools in criminology, psychology and sociology, network intervention will also require: (1) international and inter‐institutional collaboration, and (2) efficient and comprehensive tools to monitor intervention impact. For example, the newly formed Asian Songbird Trade Specialist Group of the IUCN/SSC creates synergies of scale by bringing together a range of experts from different sectors to find creative approaches to reverse the growing threat to songbirds that trade presents. These include transportation sector engagement, environmental and enforcement interagency collaboration, consumer behavior and demand reduction, financial investigation and asset recovery, community engagement and emerging technologies for monitoring (tracking devices, forensic technology, social media data mining, etc; IUCN, 2020). Such cooperation contrasts with the presently weak links among most South American conservation organizations confronting IWT. For example, the first conference focused on wildlife trafficking in the Americas was organized just last year (CITES, 2019). In Venezuela, not a single international environmental NGO presently operates, and although some international funding supports research and action, Venezuelan NGOs operate largely in isolation, without backing from national environmental and enforcement authorities. This situation will likely need to shift for large changes to occur.

In the meantime, in the context of specialized trade, small organizations have a way forward. In addition to understanding driving factors and implementing interventions, they may employ pioneering approaches to evaluation, in order to improve efficacy. We agree with Farine (2020) that analytical tools like stochastic actor‐based models could be used to assess changes in trade network dynamics in response to conservation interventions. In the case of RS, for example, it will be possible to assess whether breeders adjust their use of wild‐caught RS in concert with behavior changes observed in their direct network connections. Such approaches, when combined with efforts at improved international and inter‐agency collaboration, present promising opportunities for mitigating the threat of illegal wildlife trade.

小型组织面对非法野生动植物贸易（IWT）网络所面临的挑战可能是巨大而可怕的。在高度腐败，政治动荡和社会动荡的情况下，获取有关演员身份，联系和贸易流的信息可能会给人身安全带来风险。然而，正是在这些情况下，非法野生动植物贸易可能蓬勃发展，,带其他违禁品贸易。在我们最近的工作中，我们检查了这样的假设，即这种``平行''贩运将主导委内瑞拉受威胁的新热带雀科，红色西斯金（RS，Spinus cucullatus）的贸易（Sánchez-Mercado等，2019）。）。委内瑞拉的经济状况自2014年以来经历了历史性下降：到2017年，约87％的人口生活在贫困中，而从2013年至2018年，GDP下降了45％以上（España＆Ponce，2017）。我们预计，“硬”外币的诱惑，加上普遍存在的违法行为，将使内河运输与其他非法物品并驾齐驱。尽管有这些条件，尽管我们确实找到了一个活跃而复杂的RS贸易网络，但我们几乎没有发现平行贸易的证据，而是找到了一个网络，该网络依赖于运输和执法逃逸的专门后勤能力以及具有专门技能的中介。尽管发现活跃的网络并不是一个好消息，但是我们发现的网络结构为小型组织带来了意想不到的机会，以应对这种贸易挑战，尤其是在南美的情况下。

感谢Farine（2020），Tsang（2020）和Kahler（2020）对我们的研究的慷慨和宝贵见解，以及他们对注意事项和对未来工作的建议的认真注意。例如，我们同意，找不到平行贸易的证据并不意味着不存在平行贸易。如卡勒（2020）和曾（2020））注意，虽然我们未能找到证据证明平行贸易并非易事，但其原因可能不是由于访谈对象（他们自由共享有关联系信息）的报告不足，而是由于抽样工作不足，尤其是潜在的国际合谋者和中介人。但是，平行贩运只是内河运输网络运行的一种方式，它具有组织化的金字塔结构，并且通量以垄断或权力人物为主，例如犀牛，象牙或老虎产品。新热带鹦鹉贸易网络的结构提出了另一种替代方案（Pires，Schneider和Herrera，2016年）。与他们的发现相似，我们发现演员之间或演员之间几乎没有正式的组织。这种作案手法尽管并非南美国家独有，但可能是由于他们普遍缺乏环保执法所致：普通个人可以以较低的风险参加IWT，而无需有组织犯罪集团。因此，我们缺乏对平行贸易的检测可能反映了现实，而不仅仅是采样偏差。

RS中大量的“专业化”贸易而非并行贸易的潜在现实不仅令人恐惧，而且还为小型组织提供了一个机会来冲击内河运输的挑战。尽管一些育种者成为RS网络通量的关键调制器，但我们没有发现明显的瓶颈。这意味着该网络不仅可以传播鸟类，还可以传播有针对性的信息，重点是减少对野生RS的使用（Red Siskin Initiative，2019）。了解关键角色为何偏爱野外捕获的RS和圈养的RS对于设计此类信息进行传播至关重要。保护心理学的方法，例如计划行为理论，可以用来检验有关推动RS使用的行为因素（例如态度，社会规范，感知控制）的假设（Veríssimo等，2020年））。例如，野生RS的使用可能是由于对良性替代品（例如圈养鸟）的无知（“无知”假设）或由于圈养替代品的供应不足以满足需求（“可用性”假设）而引起的。另一方面，圈养繁殖可能会带来挑战，导致圈养的标本昂贵（“成本”假设）。最后，对野生鸟类的过度开发可能是由以下信念引起的：定期用野生捕获的鸟类“刷新”鸡群保持遗传变异性（“刷新”假设）。评估这些假设为将来的行为改变运动提供了重点。例如，如果对遗传“刷新”的态度解释了使用野生捕捞个体的意图的显着差异，然后适当地散布有关圈养鸟类经验的信息可能是适当的，特别是如果与讲习班结合以提高当地的育种技能，则尤其如此。或者，如果“成本”假设得到更多支持，则旨在降低成本的干预措施可能更有效。

但是，尽管小型组织可以使用上述犯罪学，心理学和社会学工具成功减轻IWT网络的影响，但网络干预还需要：（1）国际和机构间合作，以及（2）有效而全面的工具监视干预的影响。例如，新成立的IUCN / SSC的亚洲鸣鸟贸易专家小组通过召集来自不同领域的众多专家来寻找规模创新的方法，以扭转贸易对鸣鸟日益增长的威胁，从而产生规模协同效应。其中包括运输部门的参与，环境与执法部门间的协作，消费者行为和需求减少，财务调查和资产追回，2020年）。这种合作与大多数与内河运输面对的南美保护组织之间目前薄弱的联系形成了鲜明的对比。例如，去年才举办了第一次关于美洲野生动植物贩运的会议（CITES，2019）。在委内瑞拉，目前没有一个国际环境非政府组织在运作，尽管有一些国际资金支持研究和行动，但委内瑞拉非政府组织在很大程度上是孤立地运作，没有国家环境和执法当局的支持。这种情况可能需要转移才能发生大的变化。

同时，在专业贸易的背景下，小型组织有前进的道路。除了了解驱动因素和实施干预措施外，他们还可以采用开创性的方法进行评估，以提高疗效。我们同意Farine（2020）的观点，即可以使用基于随机参与者的模型之类的分析工具来评估贸易网络动态的变化，以响应保护措施。例如，对于RS，将有可能评估育种者是否根据在其直接网络连接中观察到的行为变化来调整对野生捕获RS的使用。这些方法与努力改善国际和机构间合作相结合，为减轻非法野生动植物贸易的威胁提供了可喜的机会。