Abstract The environmental investment, protecting and improving environmental quality and preventing deterioration of the ecological environment, can reduce costs of the environmentalist and even bring some benefits. It is an inevitable phenomenon that the efficiency of environmental investment is related to the social attention, driven by the rapid development of the Internet. And the public response to the ecological status with various patterns can affect the social attention, further change the compensation to cooperators from environmental investment. In the public goods game considering environmental investment, we model a society in which attitudes and behaviors co-evolve and classify the entire population into four categories to establish a differential equation system into the interplay of social attention and ecological situation using the mean field approximation. The response mechanism can disturb the fluctuation of various groups, so the level of cooperation moves and the level of social attention does not. Among three different response mechanisms, the precautionary mechanism is the most beneficial to cooperation. The more timely the response, the higher the cooperation rate. We also can conclude that the cooperation emerges when the sensitivity is relatively greater than the forgetfulness to a certain extent. There is an interval of stable level of the attention, within which the sensitivity and the forgetfulness have no impact on it. Only when the budget is greater than a threshold can cooperation emerge and be pushed in this way – the more budget, the slower promotion. Not surprisingly, researches on the interplay between social attention and individual behavior are instructive, which help us to better coordinate the actions of all parties and solve ecological problem effectively.

中文翻译：

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考虑环境投资的公共产品博弈中行为与态度的相互作用

摘要 环境投资，保护和改善环境质量，防止生态环境恶化，可以降低环保人士的成本，甚至带来一定的收益。在互联网的高速发展的推动下，环境投资的效率与社会关注度相关是必然现象。而公众对生态状况的各种反应，会影响社会的关注度，进一步改变环境投资对合作者的补偿。在考虑环境投资的公共产品博弈中，我们模拟了一个态度和行为共同进化的社会，并将整个人口分为四类，以使用平均场近似建立一个微分方程系统，以反映社会注意力和生态状况的相互作用。反应机制可以扰乱各个群体的波动，所以合作水平移动，社会关注水平不变。在三种不同的应对机制中，预防机制最有利于合作。反应越及时，合作率越高。我们也可以得出结论，当敏感性相对大于健忘到一定程度时，合作就会出现。注意有一个稳定水平的区间，在这个区间内敏感和健忘对其没有影响。只有当预算大于阈值时，合作才会出现并以此方式推动——预算越多，推广越慢。不足为奇，社会关注与个体行为相互作用的研究具有指导意义，有助于我们更好地协调各方行动，有效解决生态问题。