Abstract We analyze in a game-theoretic framework the sequential product positioning problem of two asymmetric firms with different quality levels on a platform when network effects present, where the negative influences of product differentiation on product compatibility are explicitly considered. We obtain closed-form solutions to the positioning problem, and reveal that whether the traditional wisdom of positioning in the mass market is still optimal for the leader in our setting depends not only on whether it has a quality advantage over the follower, but also on the intensity of the network effects. For the follower, as the network effects increase or its quality advantage increases, its product positioning approaches the mass product; otherwise, the opposite is true. We also observe that the optimal degree of differentiation has certain robustness with respect to the order of the positioning decisions. In addition, we find that the degree of product differentiation in the sequential positioning scenario is lower than in the simultaneously positioning scenario, while it is higher than in the social welfare maximization scenario. This research provides concrete guidelines for high-tech firms to make pertinent strategic decisions, and lays a foundation for platform managers to design policies to coordinate its members.

中文翻译：

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存在网络效应的平台上的顺序产品定位

摘要 我们在博弈论框架中分析了当网络效应存在时两个不同质量水平的非对称公司在平台上的顺序产品定位问题，其中明确考虑了产品差异化对产品兼容性的负面影响。我们获得了定位问题的封闭式解决方案，并揭示了大众市场的传统定位智慧对于我们的设置中的领导者是否仍然是最优的不仅取决于它是否比追随者具有质量优势，还取决于网络效应的强度。对于追随者来说，随着网络效应的增强或质量优势的增强，其产品定位趋近于大众产品；否则，情况正好相反。我们还观察到最佳微分度对于定位决策的顺序具有一定的鲁棒性。此外，我们发现顺序定位场景下的产品差异化程度低于同时定位场景，而高于社会福利最大化场景。本研究为高科技公司做出有针对性的战略决策提供了具体指导，并为平台管理者制定政策以协调其成员奠定了基础。