Considering the multiple effects of product greenness and carbon emission trading, this article constructs a differential game model to study the collaborative innovation between enterprises in a green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. This article examines the optimal green technology innovation strategies, optimal revenues of manufacturers and suppliers as well as the overall green supply chain revenues in the Nash non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg master-slave game model, and cooperative game model, respectively. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the optimal strategies of suppliers and manufacturers as well as the total revenue of the green supply chain in the cooperative games are better than those in the non-cooperative game scenario. Meanwhile, undertaking part of suppliers' green innovation cost by manufacturers is the Pareto optimization mechanism that increases the total revenue of the green supply chain and their respective revenues. The research results of this article provide theoretical support for green supply chain enterprises to formulate incentive mechanisms for scientific strategy-making and reasonable revenue distribution.

中文翻译：

---

基于碳排放交易的绿色供应链企业协同创新研究

考虑产品绿色化和碳排放交易的多重效应，本文构建微分博弈模型，研究一制造商一供应商组成的绿色供应链中企业间的协同创新。本文分别考察了纳什非合作博弈模型、Stackelberg主从博弈模型和合作博弈模型下的最优绿色技术创新策略、制造商和供应商的最优收益以及整体绿色供应链收益。通过均衡结果对比分析发现，合作博弈场景下供应商和制造商的最优策略以及绿色供应链总收益均优于非合作博弈场景。同时，制造商承担部分供应商的绿色创新成本，是增加绿色供应链总收入及其各自收入的帕累托优化机制。本文的研究成果为绿色供应链企业制定激励机制、科学制定战略、合理收益分配提供理论支撑。