By viewing political and social corruption through the lens of the control theory of complex systems, this paper will provide some insight into the effects of corruption and outside control on incentives which direct the formation and evolution of social networks, and the intrinsic hierarchies which they encode. This paper proposes and tests the hypothesis that changes in the rate of competition among nodes to raise their control capacity, incentivized by the anticipation of payment through political corruption opportunities, can be identified by changes in an indicator of the controllability of the network at points where the network undergoes a structural change. A theoretical model of control input preference is formulated which leads to a testable hypothesis about the direction of correlation between controllability of a network and the presence of corruption. Results support the hypothesis that as corruption increases, the network becomes more difficult to control as all members alter their linking strategies to ensure that they get a piece of the action. We describe this novel effect as “hierarchical congestion”, to reflect the emergent phenomenon in which individuals making effort to move themselves to the top of the controllability hierarchy increase the number of driver nodes required to fully control the network.

中文翻译：

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政治腐败和社交网络中可控性的拥挤

通过从复杂系统的控制理论的角度观察政治和社会腐败，本文将提供一些见识，以了解腐败和外部控制对引导社会网络形成和演化的激励机制及其编码的内在层次结构的影响。 。本文提出并检验了以下假设，即节点之间竞争率的变化以提高其控制能力，而这种变化是通过预测网络中政治可控机会带来的激励而被激励的，该变化可以通过以下点的网络可控制性指标的变化来识别：网络发生了结构性变化。建立了控制输入偏好的理论模型，该模型导致了关于网络的可控制性与损坏的存在之间的相关方向的可检验的假设。结果支持以下假设：随着腐败的增加，网络将变得更加难以控制，因为所有成员都会更改其链接策略以确保他们能采取行动。我们将这种新颖的效应描述为“分层拥塞”，以反映出现的现象，在这种现象中，人们努力将自己移至可控性层次结构的顶部会增加完全控制网络所需的驱动程序节点的数量。随着所有成员改变其链接策略以确保他们能采取行动，网络变得更加难以控制。我们将这种新颖的效应描述为“分层拥塞”，以反映出现的现象，在这种现象中，人们努力将自己移至可控性层次结构的顶部会增加完全控制网络所需的驱动程序节点的数量。随着所有成员改变其链接策略以确保他们能采取行动，网络变得更加难以控制。我们将这种新颖的效应描述为“分层拥塞”，以反映出现的现象，在这种现象中，人们努力将自己移至可控性层次结构的顶部会增加完全控制网络所需的驱动程序节点的数量。