Trust is a double‐edged sword. When warranted, it leads to positive and rewarding interactions. When not, it leads to disappointment and anger. Therefore, it has been argued that people will display “betrayal aversion” in trust situations (i.e., avoid trusting to avoid betrayal). Yet, people also feel tense and uneasy when they signal distrust to another person and thus show signs of “principled trustfulness” (i.e., choosing to trust others although being skeptical of their trustworthiness). These two theoretical orientations imply directly opposite influences on trust behavior. Thus, we conducted two laboratory studies (with a total of 841 participants) with binary trust games (implying a risk of being betrayed) and extended lottery games (implying no such risk). In both studies, we varied the payoff structures of both games. Further, we made sure that the average perceived likelihood of winning or losing money when choosing the risky option was identical in both games, as was the distribution of these likelihoods. Neither study showed any sign of betrayal aversion. Rather, participants were more willing to risk their money in the trust game than they were to invest their money in a lottery, supporting the principled trustfulness view. We discuss possible explanations why, unlike previous studies, we did not find any indication of betrayal aversion.

中文翻译：

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背叛厌恶是否真的将信任决策引向陌生人？

信任是一把双刃剑。必要时，它可以带来积极而有益的互动。否则，它会导致失望和愤怒。因此，有人认为人们在信任的情况下会表现出“背叛厌恶”（即避免信任以避免背叛）。但是，当人们对他人表示不信任时，也会感到紧张和不安，从而表现出“原则上的信任”（即，尽管对自己的信任度表示怀疑，但选择信任他人）。这两个理论取向意味着对信任行为的直接相反的影响。因此，我们进行了两项针对二进制信任游戏（暗示有被背叛的风险）和扩展彩票游戏（暗示无此风险）的实验室研究（共有841名参与者）。在两项研究中，我们都改变了两种游戏的收益结构。进一步，我们确保在选择风险选项时，在两种游戏中平均获利或亏损的感知可能性相同，这些可能性的分布也相同。两项研究均未显示出背叛的迹象。相反，与将钱投资在彩票上以支持原则性信任观点相比，参与者更愿意在信任游戏中冒险花钱。我们讨论可能的解释，为什么与以往的研究不同，我们没有发现任何背叛厌恶的迹象。与将钱投资在彩票上以支持原则性信任观点相比，参与者更愿意在信任游戏中冒险花钱。我们讨论可能的解释，为什么与以往的研究不同，我们没有发现任何背叛厌恶的迹象。与将钱投资在彩票上以支持原则性信任观点相比，参与者更愿意在信任游戏中冒险花钱。我们讨论可能的解释，为什么与以往的研究不同，我们没有发现任何背叛厌恶的迹象。