In this article, we empirically examine the impact of farm size and insured type on returns from crop insurance participation in four regions using unit‐level crop insurance contract data. Our quasi‐panel empirical model provides guidance on whether larger producers are riskier than smaller producers and whether cash producers are riskier than landlords. In our sample, we did not find evidence that large producers obtain higher returns from insurance participation than their smaller counterparts. In fact, we found evidence of the opposite that larger producers in Iowa and Nebraska receive less than their smaller counterparts. Our farm size results suggest that any legislation limiting crop insurance participation from large producers would negatively influence the insurance pool, driving up premiums and consequently administrative and operational subsidies and per‐acre premium subsidy dollars. We did find evidence that cash insured types get more back in insurance than landlords in both Montana and Oklahoma, suggesting the possibility of moral hazard in input usage. Our results also highlight spatial differences in crop insurance outcomes.

中文翻译：

---

农场规模和保险类型对农作物保险收益的影响

在本文中，我们使用单位级别的作物保险合同数据，以实证方法检验了四个地区的农场规模和保险类型对作物保险参与收益的影响。我们的准面板经验模型为较大的生产者是否比较小的生产者具有风险，以及现金生产者是否比业主具有较高的风险提供了指导。在我们的样本中，我们没有发现证据表明大型生产者比小型生产者从保险参与中获得更高的回报。实际上，我们发现相反的证据表明，爱荷华州和内布拉斯加州的大型生产商获得的收益少于小型生产者。我们的农场规模结果表明，任何限制大型生产商参与作物保险的立法都会对保险库产生负面影响，提高保费，从而提高行政和运营补贴以及每英亩保费补贴美元。我们确实发现有证据表明，在蒙大拿州和俄克拉荷马州，现金保险类型比房东获得的保险回报更多，这表明投入使用中可能存在道德风险。我们的结果还突出了作物保险结果的空间差异。