The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this position: Shea’s (Biol Philos 22:313–331, 2007a, Br J Philos Sci 64:1–31, 2013a) view that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. I distinguish between two ways of individuating genes in contemporary biological science as possible vehicles of representational content—as molecular genes and as difference-maker genes. I show that given either of these ways of individuating genes, genes fail to meet conditions which the teleosemantic theory requires an entity to meet if that entity is to qualify as a representational vehicle that represents a whole-organism phenotype. The considerations I present against Shea’s view generalize to other attempts to use the teleosemantic theory in support of the claim that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes.

中文翻译：

---

难以捉摸的基因表达载体

一些哲学家认为表征内容的远程语义理论暗示基因携带有关整个生物体表型的语义信息。在本文中，我认为这一立场没有得到实证研究结果的支持。我专注于对这一立场的最详尽的辩护之一：Shea (Biol Philos 22:313–331, 2007a, Br J Philos Sci 64:1–31, 2013a) 的观点，即基因代表整个生物体的表型。我区分了当代生物科学中将基因个体化为可能具有代表性内容的两种方式——作为分子基因和作为差异基因。我表明，给定这些基因个体化方式中的任何一种，基因不能满足远程语义理论要求实体满足的条件，如果该实体有资格作为代表整个生物体表型的代表性载体。我提出的反对 Shea 观点的考虑推广到其他尝试使用远程语义理论来支持基因代表整个生物体表型的主张。