We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers. Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives. We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions. Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.

中文翻译：

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有支持的公共池资源

我们研究了支持联盟稳定性在诸如渔业游戏等公共资源游戏中的作用。一些玩家可能不想加入共同管理资源的联盟。尽管如此，因为他们从溢出效应中受益，他们可能希望通过转移支付来支持联盟，以激励其他人加入。我们发现支持对这个博弈均衡的影响仅限于三到五名玩家的博弈。给资源经理的建议。联盟可能能够有效地管理公共池资源，例如渔业，但由于搭便车的激励，这种联盟往往不稳定。我们探讨了转移计划的影响，该计划可以提高这种联盟的稳定性，从而形成更大、更有效的联盟。