We consider a fishery described by two state variables, namely, the stock of fi sh and its marine environmental quality, operationalized as an index of habitat extent and quality, which influences the growth rate and the carrying capacity (MEQ). Assuming that myopic fishing agents exploit the fishery, we characterize and contrast the steady-state values in two scenarios: (i) a scenario where the agents (correctly) perceive that the MEQ is non-constant and (ii) a scenario where they behave as if the MEQ is a given constant. Not unexpectedly, the harvest rates diff er across the two scenarios and consequently lead to di fferent steady states. Interestingly, for some parameter values, we obtain that assuming a constant MEQ has a conservation flavor, that is, it results in a larger stock of fish and higher MEQ in the steady state. We show that there exists a steady-state solution to the planner's problem, and that it can be supported by a large number of appropriately designed tax schemes, while the approach path to the steady state depends on the implemented tax scheme. We also discuss the implications for optimal regulation under open access when habitat matters.

中文翻译：

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考虑渔业的海洋环境质量时的最佳捕捞和征税

我们考虑由两个状态变量描述的渔业，即鱼类种群及其海洋环境质量，作为栖息地范围和质量的指标进行操作，影响增长率和承载能力（MEQ）。假设近视捕鱼代理利用渔业，我们在两种情况下描述和对比稳态值：（i）代理（正确）认为 MEQ 是非常数的情况和（ii）他们表现的情况就好像 MEQ 是给定的常数一样。不出所料，两种情况下的收获率不同，因此导致不同的稳态。有趣的是，对于某些参数值，我们假设恒定的 MEQ 具有保护风味，也就是说，它会导致更大的鱼类种群和稳定状态下更高的 MEQ。我们表明，规划者问题存在稳态解决方案，并且它可以得到大量适当设计的税收方案的支持，而达到稳态的途径取决于实施的税收方案。我们还讨论了当栖息地很重要时开放获取下最佳监管的影响。