A recent line of work has explored the use of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) for secure computation, with the goals of (1) achieving universal composability without additional setup and/or (2) obtaining unconditional security (i.e., avoiding complexity-theoretic assumptions). Initial work assumed that all PUFs, even those created by an attacker, are honestly generated. Subsequently, researchers have investigated models in which an adversary can create malicious PUFs with arbitrary behavior. Researchers have considered both malicious PUFs that might be stateful , as well as malicious PUFs that can have arbitrary behavior but are guaranteed to be stateless . We settle the main open questions regarding secure computation in the malicious-PUF model: We prove that unconditionally secure oblivious transfer is impossible, even in the stand-alone setting, if the adversary can construct (malicious) stateful PUFs. We show that if the attacker is limited to creating (malicious) stateless PUFs, then universally composable two-party computation is possible, unconditionally.

中文翻译：

---

使用恶意 PUF 进行安全计算的可行性和不可行性

最近的一项工作探索了使用物理不可克隆函数 (PUF) 进行安全计算，其目标是 (1) 无需额外设置即可实现通用可组合性和/或 (2) 获得无条件安全性（即避免复杂性理论假设）。最初的工作假设所有 PUF，即使是由攻击者创建的，都是诚实生成的。随后，研究人员研究了攻击者可以创建具有任意行为的恶意 PUF 的模型。研究人员考虑了可能有状态的恶意 PUF，以及可能具有任意行为但保证无状态的恶意 PUF。我们解决了关于恶意 PUF 模型中安全计算的主要开放问题：我们证明无条件安全的不经意传输是不可能的，即使在独立设置中，如果对手可以构建（恶意）有状态的 PUF。我们表明，如果攻击者仅限于创建（恶意的）无状态 PUF，则无条件地可以进行普遍可组合的两方计算。