We propose a notion of alternating bisimulation for strategic abilities under imperfect information. The bisimulation preserves formulas of ATL^⁎ for both the objective and subjective variants of the state-based semantics with imperfect information, which are commonly used in the modeling and verification of multi-agent systems. Furthermore, we apply the theoretical result to the verification of coercion-resistance in the ThreeBallot voting system, a voting protocol that does not use cryptography. In particular, we show that natural simplifications of an initial model of the protocol are in fact bisimulations of the original model, and therefore satisfy the same ATL^⁎ properties, including coercion-resistance. These simplifications allow the model-checking tool MCMAS to terminate on models with a larger number of voters and candidates, compared with the initial model.

我们提出了在信息不完善的情况下对战略能力进行交替双仿真的概念。ATL的互模拟蜜饯公式^⁎两者的客观和主观不完美信息的基于状态的语义，它们通常在建模和多代理系统的验证中使用的变体。此外，我们将理论结果应用于在不使用密码学的投票协议ThreeBallot投票系统中的抗强制性验证。特别是，我们证明了协议初始模型的自然简化实际上是原始模型的双仿真，因此满足相同的^ATL⁎特性，包括抗压性。通过进行这些简化，与初始模型相比，模型检查工具MCMAS可以终止具有大量选民和候选人的模型。