When fish stocks migrate across multiple exclusive economic zones (EEZs), they compel managers to examine management at both national and international levels. A strategic interaction emerges when the fishing activity of one country impacts fishing opportunities available for other countries sharing the stock. Left unaddressed, strategic interaction could lead to overexploitation and suboptimal payoffs. Here, we develop and apply a bioeconomic model to address the competitive fishing for silver pomfret in the Arabian/Persian Gulf—a highly commercial fish stock shared between Kuwait and Iran—and evaluate biological–economic trade-offs under competition, cooperation, and country-independent management using maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and fishing mortality that maintain MSY (F_msy) policies. When cooperation involves an equal share of the overall F_msy or a share based on the proportion of the stock available in each EEZ, countries are expected to cooperate given the substantially higher catch, biomass, and relative profits compared to other management regimes. However, other than these two arrangements, countries would favour different regimes. Besides providing policy insights to improve the perilous status of silver pomfret, our approach could be useful in exploring alternative fishing arrangements to sustainably harvest a transboundary fish stock while maximizing average yields.

中文翻译：

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年龄结构化战略互动生物经济模型：在阿拉伯/波斯湾Gulf鱼种群中的应用

当鱼类种群跨多个专属经济区（EEZ）迁移时，它们迫使管理者在国家和国际层面上检查管理。当一个国家的捕捞活动影响共享该种群的其他国家可获得的捕捞机会时，就会形成战略互动。如果不加以解决，战略互动可能会导致过度开发和不理想的回报。在这里，我们开发并应用生物经济模型来解决阿拉伯/波斯湾白po的竞争性捕捞活动（科威特和伊朗共享高度商业化的鱼类资源），并评估竞争，合作和国家之间在生物经济方面的权衡使用最大可持续产量（MSY）和维持MSY（F _msy）政策。当合作涉及到整体的相等份额˚F _MSY或基于每个专属经济区可用股票的比例份额，预计各国合作给予相当高的渔获量，生物量，以及相对于其他管理制度的相对收益。但是，除了这两种安排外，各国都倾向于采用不同的制度。除了提供政策见解以改善银po鱼的危险状况之外，我们的方法还可能有助于探索其他捕捞安排，以可持续地收获越境鱼类种群，同时使平均单产最大化。