We study market equilibria that are achieved by strategic firms that participate in electricity and natural gas markets. Strategic firms submit their offers and bids to both markets with the aim of maximizing profit or utility and we consider firms that can include a combination of electricity and natural gas supply and demand. The strategic actions of these firms are represented by upper-level problems that are optimized subject to shared lower-level problems that represent the clearing of electricity and natural gas markets. This market structure and our modeling approach yields a multiple-leader/two-follower complementarity problem. We develop a modeling approach that can find equilibria with different characteristics, e.g., maximized social welfare, producer profits, or consumer welfare. We demonstrate numerically that producers aim typically to increase market prices while consumers seek to decrease them.

中文翻译：

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电力和天然气市场与战略要约和投标的平衡

我们研究了参与电力和天然气市场的战略公司实现的市场均衡。战略公司向这两个市场提交报价和投标，目的是实现利润或效用最大化，我们考虑可以将电力和天然气供应和需求结合起来的公司。这些公司的战略行动由上层问题代表，这些问题在代表电力和天然气市场出清的共享下层问题的基础上得到优化。这种市场结构和我们的建模方法产生了多个领导者/两个追随者的互补问题。我们开发了一种建模方法，可以找到具有不同特征的均衡，例如最大化社会福利、生产者利润或消费者福利。