Abstract When confronting the epidemics or pandemics, there often exists an interplay between epidemic incidence and the vaccination strategies of individuals. Recently, the characteristics of human behaviors, such as imitating nature or bandwagon effect, have been proven critical to the final herd immunity. In this paper, by establishing a two-layered multiplex network model which combines SIR epidemic process, vaccination decision-making and imitating human nature, we discover that imitating behavior would restrain the increase of herd immunity, which is verified by Monte Carlo simulations and mean-field equations, respectively. Interestingly, a suitable quantity of conformity motivated individual, counter-intuitively, could be beneficial to save the social costs. At the same time, we analytically determine the precise conditions for the minimum total social costs. The current results can help to understand the behavior of social group in depth and then explore public attitudes concerning the vaccine, which usually has a tremendous impact on social vaccine take-up within the population.

中文翻译：

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博弈论下疫情传播与人为决策耦合的疫苗接种行为

摘要 在面对流行病或大流行病时，流行病发生率与个体的疫苗接种策略之间往往存在相互作用。最近，人类行为的特征，如模仿自然或潮流效应，已被证明对最终的群体免疫至关重要。在本文中，通过建立一个结合 SIR 流行过程、疫苗接种决策和模仿人性的两层多重网络模型，我们发现模仿行为会抑制群体免疫的增加，这通过 Monte Carlo 模拟和均值-场方程，分别。有趣的是，与直觉相反，适量的从众动机可能有利于节省社会成本。同时，我们通过分析确定最低社会总成本的精确条件。目前的结果有助于深入了解社会群体的行为，进而探索公众对疫苗的态度，这通常会对人群中的社会疫苗接种产生巨大影响。