Abstract General equilibrium analysis shows that regulation based on caps on working hours per vessel affects the entry/exit margin (more low productivity vessels stay in the fishery), wages (a less productive fleet implies lower equilibrium wages) and aggregate employment allocated to the sector. Although the total number of vessels increases, in a general equilibrium setting, total employment in the fishery is reduced and the aggregate rents generated in the fishery are lower. Moreover, regulatory policies based on input controls also affect capital dynamics across the stock recovery phases. In comparison with a fishery regulated via efficient instruments, we find that those dynamics are characterized by fewer exits of vessels. Finally, using data from the Western Mediterranean Sea, we show that the use of input controls gives rise to a Spanish fleet around 14 percent larger than the one that would result from a non-distortionary instrument.

中文翻译：

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投入控制和过度资本化：西班牙地中海渔业的一般均衡分析

摘要 一般均衡分析表明，基于每艘船舶工作时间上限的监管会影响进入/退出利润率（更多低生产力船舶留在渔业中）、工资（生产力较低的船队意味着较低的均衡工资）和分配给该部门的总就业. 尽管船舶总数增加，但在一般均衡环境中，渔业总就业减少，渔业产生的总租金较低。此外，基于输入控制的监管政策也会影响整个库存恢复阶段的资本动态。与通过有效工具监管的渔业相比，我们发现这些动态的特点是船只出口较少。最后，使用来自西地中海的数据，