ABSTRACT A central planner wishes to engage a collection of sensors to measure a quantity. Each sensor seeks to trade-off the effort it invests to obtain and report a measurement, against contracted reward. Assuming that measurement quality improves as a sensor increases the effort it invests, the problem of the reward contract design is investigated. To this end, a game is formulated between the central planner and the sensors. Using this game, it is established that the central planner can enhance the quality of the estimate by rewarding each sensor based on the distance between the average of the received measurements and the measurement provided by the sensor. Optimal contracts are designed from the perspective of the budget required to achieve a specified level of error performance.

中文翻译：

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努力避免传感器的最优契约设计

摘要 中央计划者希望使用一组传感器来测量数量。每个传感器都试图权衡它为获得和报告测量而付出的努力与合同约定的奖励。假设测量质量随着传感器增加其投入的努力而提高，则研究奖励合同设计的问题。为此，在中央规划器和传感器之间制定了一个游戏。使用这个游戏，确定中央规划器可以通过基于接收到的测量值的平均值与传感器提供的测量值之间的距离奖励每个传感器来提高估计的质量。最佳合同是从实现指定错误性能水平所需的预算的角度设计的。