当前位置: X-MOL 学术arXiv.cs.SY › 论文详情
Controlling Human Utilization of Failure-Prone Systems via Taxes
arXiv - CS - Systems and Control Pub Date : 2018-02-26 , DOI: arxiv-1802.09490
Ashish R. Hota; Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate, under suitable assumptions.
更新日期:2020-04-08

 

全部期刊列表>>
智控未来
聚焦商业经济政治法律
跟Nature、Science文章学绘图
控制与机器人
招募海内外科研人才,上自然官网
隐藏1h前已浏览文章
课题组网站
新版X-MOL期刊搜索和高级搜索功能介绍
ACS材料视界
x-mol收录
湖南大学化学化工学院刘松
上海有机所
李旸
南方科技大学
西湖大学
X-MOL
支志明
中山大学化学工程与技术学院
试剂库存
天合科研
down
wechat
bug