Random attacks that jointly minimize the amount of information acquired by the operator about the state of the grid and the probability of attack detection are presented. The attacks minimize the information acquired by the operator by minimizing the mutual information between the observations and the state variables describing the grid. Simultaneously, the attacker aims to minimize the probability of attack detection by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the distribution when the attack is present and the distribution under normal operation. The resulting cost function is the weighted sum of the mutual information and the KL divergence mentioned above. The tradeoff between the probability of attack detection and the reduction of mutual information is governed by the weighting parameter on the KL divergence term in the cost function. The probability of attack detection is evaluated as a function of the weighting parameter. A sufficient condition on the weighting parameter is given for achieving an arbitrarily small probability of attack detection. The attack performance is numerically assessed on the IEEE 30-Bus and 118-Bus test systems.

中文翻译：

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对智能电网的隐形攻击

随机攻击联合最小化运营商获取的有关电网状态和攻击检测概率的信息量。攻击通过最小化观察和描述网格的状态变量之间的互信息来最小化操作员获取的信息。同时，攻击者旨在通过最小化存在攻击时的分布与正常操作下的分布之间的 Kullback-Leibler (KL) 散度来最小化攻击检测的概率。得到的代价函数就是上面提到的互信息和KL散度的加权和。攻击检测概率和互信息减少之间的权衡由成本函数中 KL 散度项的加权参数控制。攻击检测的概率被评估为加权参数的函数。给出了实现任意小概率攻击检测的权重参数的充分条件。攻击性能在 IEEE 30-Bus 和 118-Bus 测试系统上进行数值评估。