Recent developments in energy consumption ‘management’ have heightened the need for energy efficiency considerations in energy-intensive supply chains, according to the sustainable development framework. Therefore, policy-makers need to find out how they can improve these conditions, considering the resource limitations and energy requirements. According to these issues, we address a novel pricing model for new energy-efficient products, conventional models, and relative energy consumption under a tax-subsidy system. The products and energy services are made in a product supply chain consisting of an energy supplier and two manufacturers in a duopoly. Furthermore, the protection costs of innovation process such as copyright are investigated for the first time in this problem. Then, a multi-stage game model is developed considering two scenarios, based on different game structures. Finally, we solve the problem and provide a comprehensive analysis of the optimal values of variables and players’ profit. The results show that the first scenario has more advantages than the leader-follower competition. However, the second scenario results in less energy consumption than the first one. The findings also suggest that energy policies applied on the producer side are more effective than the consumer-side energy policies to improve energy-saving.

中文翻译：

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节能电器双寡头定价的创新保护与社会福利博弈论

根据可持续发展框架，能源消耗“管理”的最新发展提高了在能源密集型供应链中考虑能源效率的必要性。因此，考虑到资源限制和能源需求，决策者需要找出如何改善这些条件。针对这些问题，我们提出了一种新的节能产品定价模型、传统模型和税收补贴制度下的相关能源消耗。产品和能源服务是在由一个能源供应商和两个双头垄断制造商组成的产品供应链中制造的。此外，该问题首次考察了版权等创新过程的保护成本。然后，考虑两个场景开发多阶段博弈模型，基于不同的游戏结构。最后，我们解决了这个问题，并对变量的最优值和玩家的利润进行了综合分析。结果表明，第一种情景比领导者-跟随者竞争更具优势。但是，第二种情况的能耗低于第一种情况。研究结果还表明，生产者侧的能源政策比消费者侧的能源政策更能有效地提高节能效果。