Abstract Product quality depends on not only the quality effort spent during the manufacturing process but also the product manufacturability determined at the product design stage. The manufacturer (he) may keep the product design and a part of production in house and outsource some production when he encounters a large unexpected demand. In this case, he may privately own the product manufacturability information (low- or high-type) and should propose an incentive-compatible contract to signal this information to the uninformed supplier. We first consider that the manufacturer outsources to one supplier and proposes a piece rate contract, with which the supplier is charged a quality penalty proportional to the amount of defective products supplied. In the separating equilibrium, the high-type manufacturer employs a smaller quality penalty rate and thus achieves a lower product quality under asymmetric product manufacturability information than under symmetric information. When the manufacturer outsources to multiple suppliers, he can employ a tournament contract, with which the quality penalty is based on the suppliers’ relative performance. In this situation, the equilibrium tournament contract under symmetric product manufacturability information is also the separating equilibrium contract under asymmetric information, hence resulting in the first-best quality and profit. We further find that the separating equilibrium exists and is stable while no pooling equilibrium is stable.

中文翻译：

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考虑不对称产品可制造性信息的质量激励合同：计件率与锦标赛

摘要 产品质量不仅取决于制造过程中花费的质量努力，还取决于产品设计阶段确定的产品可制造性。制造商（他）可以将产品设计和部分生产保留在内部，并在遇到大量意外需求时将部分生产外包。在这种情况下，他可能私下拥有产品可制造性信息（低类型或高类型），并应提出一个激励兼容的合同，以将此信息发送给不知情的供应商。我们首先考虑制造商外包给一个供应商，并提出计件合同，供应商被收取与供应的缺陷产品数量成正比的质量罚款。在分离平衡中，高类型制造商采用更小的质量惩罚率，因此在不对称的产品可制造性信息下比对称信息下获得更低的产品质量。当制造商外包给多个供应商时，他可以采用锦标赛合同，质量惩罚是基于供应商的相对表现。在这种情况下，对称产品可制造性信息下的均衡竞赛合约也是非对称信息下的分离均衡合约，从而产生最优的质量和利润。我们进一步发现分离平衡存在并且是稳定的，而没有汇集平衡是稳定的。当制造商外包给多个供应商时，他可以采用锦标赛合同，质量惩罚是基于供应商的相对表现。在这种情况下，对称产品可制造性信息下的均衡竞赛合约也是非对称信息下的分离均衡合约，从而产生最优的质量和利润。我们进一步发现分离平衡存在并且是稳定的，而没有汇集平衡是稳定的。当制造商外包给多个供应商时，他可以采用锦标赛合同，质量惩罚是基于供应商的相对表现。在这种情况下，对称产品可制造性信息下的均衡竞赛合约也是非对称信息下的分离均衡合约，从而产生最优的质量和利润。我们进一步发现分离平衡存在并且是稳定的，而没有汇集平衡是稳定的。从而产生第一最好的质量和利润。我们进一步发现分离平衡存在并且是稳定的，而没有汇集平衡是稳定的。从而产生第一最好的质量和利润。我们进一步发现分离平衡存在并且是稳定的，而没有汇集平衡是稳定的。