Embedded encryption devices and smart sensors are vulnerable to physical attacks. Due to the continuous shrinking of chip size, laser injection, particle radiation and electromagnetic transient injection are possible methods that introduce transient multiple faults. In the fault analysis stage, the adversary is unclear about the actual number of faults injected. Typically, the single-nibble fault analysis encounters difficulties. Therefore, in this paper, we propose novel ciphertext-only impossible differentials that can analyze the number of random faults to six nibbles. We use the impossible differentials to exclude the secret key that definitely does not exist, and then gradually obtain the unique secret key through inverse difference equations. Using software simulation, we conducted 32,000 random multiple fault attacks on Midori. The experiments were carried out to verify the theoretical model of multiple fault attacks. We obtain the relationship between fault injection and information content. To reduce the number of fault attacks, we further optimized the fault attack method. The secret key can be obtained at least 11 times. The proposed ciphertext-only impossible differential analysis provides an effective method for random multiple faults analysis, which would be helpful for improving the security of block ciphers.

中文翻译：

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瞬态电磁多重故障的有效仿真分析。

嵌入式加密设备和智能传感器容易受到物理攻击。由于芯片尺寸不断缩小，激光注入、粒子辐射和电磁瞬态注入都是引入瞬态多重故障的可能方法。在故障分析阶段，攻击者不清楚注入的实际故障数量。通常，单半字节故障分析会遇到困难。因此，在本文中，我们提出了新颖的仅密文不可能微分，可以分析六个半字节的随机错误数量。我们利用不可能微分来排除肯定不存在的密钥，然后通过反差分方程逐步得到唯一的密钥。通过软件模拟，我们对 Midori 进行了 32,000 次随机多重故障攻击。通过实验验证了多重故障攻击的理论模型。我们获得了故障注入和信息内容之间的关系。为了减少故障攻击次数，我们进一步优化了故障攻击方法。密钥至少可以获取11次。所提出的纯密文不可能差分分析为随机多重故障分析提供了一种有效的方法，有助于提高分组密码的安全性。