An objective of network neutrality is that the design of regulations for the Internet will ensure that it remains a public, open platform where innovations can thrive. While there is broad agreement that preserving the content quality of service falls under the purview of net neutrality, the role of differential pricing, especially the practice of \emph {zero-rating} remains controversial. Even though some countries (India, Canada) have banned zero-rating, others have either taken no stance or explicitly allowed it (South Africa, Kenya, U.S.). In this paper, we model zero-rating options available between Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs) and use these models to better understand the conditions under which offering zero-rated services are preferred, and who specifically gains in utility. We develop a formulation in which providers' incomes vary, from low-income startups to high-income incumbents, and where their decisions to zero-rate are a variation of the traditional prisoner's dilemma game. We find that if zero-rating is permitted, low-income CPs often lose utility, whereas high-income CPs often gain utility. We also study the competitiveness of the CP markets via the \emph{Herfindahl Index}. Our findings suggest that in most cases the introduction of zero-rating \emph{reduces} competitiveness.

中文翻译：

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零评级和网络中立：谁赢谁输？

网络中立的一个目标是，互联网法规的设计将确保它仍然是一个公共、开放的平台，创新可以在其中蓬勃发展。虽然人们普遍认为保持服务的内容质量属于网络中立的范围，但差异定价的作用，尤其是 \emph {零评级} 的做法仍然存在争议。尽管一些国家（印度、加拿大）已禁止零评级，但其他国家（南非、肯尼亚、美国）要么不采取任何立场，要么明确允许。在本文中，我们对互联网服务提供商 (ISP) 和内容提供商 (CP) 之间可用的零费率选项进行建模，并使用这些模型来更好地了解在哪些条件下优先提供零费率服务，以及哪些人会特别受益。我们开发了一个公式，其中提供者的收入各不相同，从低收入初创公司到高收入现任者，并且他们对零利率的决定是传统囚徒困境游戏的变体。我们发现，如果允许零评级，低收入 CP 通常会失去效用，而高收入 CP 通常会获得效用。我们还通过 \emph {Herfindahl 指数} 研究 CP 市场的竞争力。我们的研究结果表明，在大多数情况下，零评级\ emph {降低}竞争力的引入。我们还通过 \emph {Herfindahl 指数} 研究 CP 市场的竞争力。我们的研究结果表明，在大多数情况下，零评级\ emph {降低}竞争力的引入。我们还通过 \emph {Herfindahl 指数} 研究 CP 市场的竞争力。我们的研究结果表明，在大多数情况下，零评级\ emph {降低}竞争力的引入。